In the last few years, Russia has intensified its diplomatic engagement of the the Muslim world and has clearly identified Muslim countries as an ideal ground to position itself favorably in the 21st century world order and to increase its influence in the Middle East. This new dynamic in Russia's foreign policy can be explained in part by the country's growing Muslim population and the need to either accommodate or integrate them in Russia's path to become again a major world power.
The 2002 census found 14,5 million Muslims in Russia (around 10% of the population). However, in 2005, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Seigei Lavrov advanced the number of 20 millions. Others claim that Russia could have as much as 26 millions, including Azeri and Central Asian migrants. (See “The Shadow of Islam over Europe” by Aleksei Malashenko in the number 50, volume 5 issue of International Affairs.)
Not only important in numbers, the Muslim population of Russia is also very important historically. Islam arrived in Russia even before Christianity and it is only after long deliberations that Prince Vladimir of the Kievan Rus chose this second religion for his people in 987. After the conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, Russia became a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state in which Muslims and Christians have had to learn to live together.
Therefore, Muslim populations of the Volga region, like Tatars, Bashkirs or Chuvashs, are an integral part of Russia. However, Muslims from the Caucasus, like Chechens, have only been integrated in the 19th century, thus explaining their weaker historical sens of belonging. Still, efforts by Chechen separatists to expand their struggle to the whole region have failed, hence showing some level of loyalty from the other Muslim people of the Caucasus toward the Russian state.
Yet, a lingering level of tension and suspicion has always existed between Christian and Muslim Russians and there is a growing sens of worry from the Orthodox majority about demographic trends predicting Muslims could represent as much as the third of the total population of the Russian Federation by 2050 (See Malashenko).
It is thus in this context that the Russian leadership has found itself facing a delicate balancing act in which it needs to accommodate and promote the spiritual, economic and political participation and development of its Muslim population, while attempting to suppress any propagation of radical and potentially dissenting interpretations of Islam within it. Consequently, Russia's observer seat at the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Putin's several speeches of solidarity with the Muslim world are meant to include Muslim Russians into Russia's international projection on the world stage.
The support from Muslim Russian leaders to any policy perceived as an act of defiance or resistance toward the West, particularly the United States, can foretell a identity merger between Russian nationalism and political Islam, where Slavic pride and anti-Americanism go hand-in-hand. This merger is inherent to Russia's post-Soviet identity search and the rise of inclusive eurasianism as a new nationalist foreign policy doctrine.
This doctrine recognizes the influence of Islamic culture on Russian identity and the duality of its nature. Eurasianists speak of a synthesis between Russia and Islam, of Russia as a “bridge of Civilizations” or of a “Eurasian renaissance.” Eurasianism calls for a return in power of Russia on the world stage, while giving Muslim Russians a preeminent role in this process (See Pepe Escobar's December 18th 2003 Asia Times Online article “Russia's 'Liberal Empire'”).
This explains why the Muslim world is seen more and more as a natural ally by Moscow. The demographic growth in the proportion of Muslims in Russia is affecting the very evolution of Russia's national identity in a way that a Russia-Muslim world rapprochement can now be seen as inevitable.