For several years, energy giant Gazprom has been a key tool in Russia's foreign policy. Through Gazprom, Moscow is hoping to spread it's influence so as to regain it's lost superpower status. The Russian natural gas leader is already very present in Europe and has slowly begun entering the American market through Canada and several Latin American countries, especially Venezuela.
While the Conservative government in Ottawa is considering the possibility of punishing Russian interests in Canada, Washington is a lot more preoccupied by what is happening south of its borders, in what was once the United States' strategic backyard.
Moscow Back in Latin America After Decades of Absence
Gazprom has recently signed a major agreement with Venezuela for the exploitation of two of its gas fields in the Caribbean Sea. At that same time of the signature, a Russian navy squadron left port for the Venezuelan coast, among which was the famous Peter the Great ship. This is the first time since the Cuban missile crisis that Russian navy ships have entered American waters.
This must be seen as part of the growing military cooperation between the two countries as well as Russian arms sales to Caracas. There are now serious talks of joint military exercises between the Russian and Venezuelan armies in the near future.
This partnership between Moscow and Caracas is but one part of Russia's growing influence in Latin America. It must be included into a broader vision of cooperative relationships with Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua – the only country apart from Russia that has recognized the independences of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Gazprom is also negotiating several gas exploitation projects in Bolivia and aims at replacing US energy companies that were displaced by President Evo Morales' nationalization of natural resources policies. Bolivia has the third largest natural gas reserves in Latin America after Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.
Latin America in Moscow's Energy Confederation
Russia and Gazprom are spreading their influence at the benefit of many producing countries in the region who welcome a new partner after years of being imposed their energy policies by Washington. The government-to-government approach and long-term preferential contracts that characterizes Russian energy relations are often more favorable than the short-term agreements, subjects to larger market fluctuations, controlled essentially by the private sector that the US oil industry used to rely on in Washington's unequal, dominant relationship with Latin America. Moreover, by creating joint companies between two partner countries, a sens of cohesion is created by the sharing of risks which cements bilateral relationships way beyond simple questions of energetic cooperation.
This cohesive framework is exactly what Russia wants as part of its goal of creating of "informal, symmetric and self-sufficient confederation of energy" (See W. Joseph Stroupe's Russian Rubicon: Impending Checkmate of the West). Unlike a cartel, this “informal confederation” unites both producers and big Asian consumers (particularly China) while excluding the liberal West. A deepening partnership between Russia and Latin American energy producers like Venezuela and Bolivia can be seen as a step in the construction of this confederation, which for Moscow is a way of reclaiming its superpower status with a global reach.
